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Introduction 
In July 2013, the OECD released its long awaited action plan 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifing (BEPS)1). The plan, which 
consists of 15 actions to be undertaken between September 
2014 and December 2015, aims at fixing rather than changing 
international corporate tax law. In essence, the measures are 
based on three core principles, i.e. coherence, substance and 
transparency. The coherence principle seeks to avoid double 
non-taxation situations stemming from domestic and/or treaty 
law differences or mismatches. The substance principle, which 
pertains to the work to be undertaken in the area of harmful tax 
competition, tax treaties and transfer pricing (TP), is designed to 
reconcile taxation in accordance with economic substance and 
income allocation with value creation. Finally, as transparency 
is essential, the plan contemplates the development of recom-
mendations regarding the design of mandatory disclosure rules 
for aggressive tax planning transactions.
At the European Union (EU) level, the EU Commission has 
taken cognizance of the BEPS action plan and has launched 
comparable initiatives. As shown in the following table, the work 
undertaken by the OECD and the EU in the international cor-
porate tax avoidance arena is “holistic” in nature. Technically, 
the plan may affect rules concerning (i) jurisdiction to tax (ii) the 
determination of taxable basis (iii) harmful tax competition and 
(iv) implementation measures. 
Field BEPS Action Plan EU
Jurisdiction 
to tax
Action 1: Digital economy 
(9.2014);  
Action 3: CFC rules (9.2015);  
Action 6: Treaty abuse (9.2014);  
Action 7: Artificial avoidance of 
PE status (9.2015) 
Digital economy expert 
group (ongoing since 
10.2013)
Taxable basis Action 2: Hybrid mismatches 
(9.2014); 
Action 4: Limitation on interest 
deductions and other financial 
payments  (9-12.2015);  Actions 
8, 9, 10 and 13: transfer pricing 
(9.2014 to 9.2015)
Code of conduct and 
proposed amendment 
to parent sub directive 
re hybrid arrange-
ments (11.2013)
Harmful tax 
competition
Action 5: (9.2014 - 9-12.2015); 
substantial activity requirement 
(review of patent box regimes in 
particular)
Code of conduct 
(review of patent box 
regimes by the end of 
2014) and minimum 
standards of good gov-
ernance in tax matters 
regarding third States 
State aid (in particular 
further impact of Gi-
braltar II?)
Implemen-
tation
Action 11: Data on BEPS 
(9.2015); 
Action 12: Mandatory disclosure 
of aggressive tax planning ar-
rangements (9.2015); 
Action 14: Dispute resolution 
(9.2015); 
Action 15: multilateral instru-
ment (9.2014-9.2015)
At the same time, the question arises as to whether EU law may 
represent a roadblock for the BEPS action plan execution. Thus, 
the compatibility of the BEPS action plan with EU taxation princi-
ples, in particular, the fundamental freedoms will have to be ad-
dressed. This tension concerns inter alia the definition of abuse, 
territorial restrictions, which are prohibited under the fundamen-
tal freedoms as well as the principle of non-discrimination. 
The BEPS action plan is of paramount importance to Switzer-
land. Moreover, Switzerland not being a member of the EU, it 
is in its interest to achieve, as much as possible, an equal level 
playing field among all OECD countries. The third corporate tax 
reform, the consultation of which is scheduled to begin at the 
end of the summer, will have to comply with these new inter-
national standards in order to ensure legal certainty on a long 
term basis. Of concern to Switzerland is in particular the work 
undertaken in the area of harmful tax competition, treaty abuse 
and transfer pricing. 
Harmful Tax Competition 
In essence, the work of the OECD and the EU now looks as to 
whether, and if so to what extent, a particular preferential regime 
is associated with a substantial activity in the relevant jurisdiction. 
This criterion is, in particular, relevant to patent box regimes which 
are currently being reviewed. At the time of writing of this contribu-
tion, three main approaches are being (or have been) considered: 
(i) a traditional transfer pricing approach that focuses on impor-
tant functions; (ii) a value creation approach which would require 
significant development activities and (iii) a nexus approach that 
requires tax benefits to be connected directly to R&D  expendi-
tures. Under the latter approach, the patent box regime would 
depend on the expenditures incurred by the entity as compared 
with those borne by other associated enterprises in relation to the 
development of the qualifying intangible. From a policy perspec-
tive, this approach seeks to ensure that a patent box regime ef-
fectively leads to actual and additional R&D activity in the relevant 
jurisdiction2). 
Yet, this line of reasoning, if it were to be confirmed, could affect 
IP structures involving outsourcing of certain R&D functions by 
the patent box entity to other associated enterprises. Similarly, 
under the substantial activity criterion, the application of a pat-
ent box regime to acquired IP (not being further developed) 
may be problematic. The results relating to the review of patent 
box regimes are to be released in September 2014. Similarly, 
at the EU level and further to the 2013 December ECOFIN 
meeting, all European patent box regimes are to be reviewed 
by the end of the year. Last but not least, the question of 
whether patent box regimes may be regarded as conferring 
a prohibited de facto selective advantage under EU State aid 
rules3) is capturing increasing attention. Indeed, as mentioned 
by the Commission at the end of March, this could hold true if it 
is established that patent box regimes de facto only benefit inter-
national mobile enterprises without creating a genuine research 
and development activity in the relevant State. The Commission 
is gathering information to determine whether this is the case4). 
In our opinion, this development does not come as a surprise 
as it is in line with the recent case law of the ECJ in the area 
of State aid rules5). 
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For Switzerland, the combined effect of the foregoing develop-
ments is clear: Any patent box contemplated by the third cor-
porate tax reform would only be viable on the long run if it is 
structured as a genuine incentive in favor of R&D. Accordingly, 
the regime should be made conditional on the exercise of a 
qualifying substantial R&D activity by the privileged entity. 
Secondly, the definition of privileged IP rights, which should 
be consistent with the alleged purpose of the incentive, should 
primarily focus on trade intangibles (restrictive catalogue). Fi-
nally, State aid rules, which the EU considers to be applicable 
to Switzerland through the 1972 Free Trade Agreement, should 
be borne in mind. Therefore, the proposed regime should apply 
as widely as possible to all enterprises, irrespective of whether 
the latter have a domestic or international activity and regard-
less of their legal form (legal entity or partnership). Similarly, 
access to the patent box should not be de facto restricted to 
some enterprises. 
Transfer Pricing 
Action 8 calls for rules to be developed to prevent BEPS by 
moving intangibles to members of a multinational operating 
in low tax jurisdictions. The BEPS action plan proposes to 
enhance the definition of intangibles, ensure appropriate al-
location of profits with value creation and develop TP rules 
for transfer of intangibles. The OECD had already issued a 
draft report on July 30th, 2013, to discuss the foregoing. In-
terestingly, the draft contains several examples which outline 
the taxpayer to whom intangible returns should be attributed. 
Several examples highlight that profits are attributed to a mem-
ber of a multinational on the basis of functions performed, as-
sets used, and risks assumed with respect to the intangible as 
opposed to mere legal ownership. Indeed, the OECD seems 
to align profits with value creation - an approach that is also be-
ing contemplated to counteract harmful tax competition vis-à-vis 
patent box regimes. The changes may impact a variety of Swiss 
IP ownership structures. 
Transparency in tax matters ranks at a high pedestal on the 
OECD’s tax agenda. Over the past few years, the exchange 
of information standard has been substantially modified and 
Switzerland has changed its approach to this standard. With 
respect to  TP, the BEPS Action plan proposes to re-examine 
TP documentation requirements to ensure transparency for 
tax administrations. The plan proposes to create rules for 
multinationals to provide the relevant governments with infor-
mation on their global allocation of the income, economic ac-
tivity and taxes paid among countries pursuant to a common 
template. In its white paper on TP documentation released on 
July 30, 2013, the OECD had proposed formats to provide tax 
authorities with a “big picture” of a multinational’s financial in-
formation that will be useful in connection with transfer pricing 
audits. A two-tiered approach was suggested which included 
the preparation of a detailed global master file and country 
specific local files. Subsequently, after a public consultation, 
the OECD released a discussion draft on TP documentation 
and country by country (CBC) reporting in accordance with 
Action Plan 13. The documentation requirements are similar 
to those suggested in the white paper. On the other hand, 
the CBC standard requires MNC’s to disclose variety of in-
formation, in particular details about the taxes paid, number 
of employees, tangible assets, in each jurisidiction in which a 
multinational operates. In our view, the OECD’s objective of 
CBC is welcome. However, there is an inherent risk that such 
information will lead to a dilution of the arms length principle 
as tax authorities may be tempted to make adjustments more 
in line with a formulary apportionment type of system. These 
developments may impact principal/hub structures operated 
from Switzerland. 
Treaty Abuse 
On March 14, 2014, the OECD published its first report to 
counter treaty abuse. The report proposes significant changes 
to the OECD Model and Commentary. Notably, the emphasis 
is on addressing treaty shopping situations wherein residents 
of third States attempt to access an existing bilateral tax trea-
ty framework. As counteraction tools, the report proposes an 
inclusion in the title and preamble of a clear statement that 
treaties are not intended to create opportunities for non or 
reduced taxation through tax avoidance and evasion, a US 
style limitation of benefit clause and a main purpose general 
anti-abuse rule that is similar to the guiding principle found 
in the OECD Commentary on Article 1. Further, a variety 
of amendments and targeted anti-avoidance rules are pro-
posed to counteract artificial reduction/elimination of source 
country withholding tax on dividends, aggressive tax plan-
ning through dual resident corporations and potential abuses 
that may result from transferring mobile assets to low taxed 
permanent establishments (PE). With respect to anti-abuse 
rules for low taxed PE’s, the draft proposes rules to deny re-
lief from source country withholding taxes on payments to 
a PE if the combined rate of tax paid by the recipient in the 
PE  and residence countries is less than 60% of the tax rate 
of the residence country. Nonetheless, exceptions are pro-
vided if the PE engages in IP development or is engaged 
in active conduct of trade or business. Moreover, it is pro-
posed that the OECD Commentary is amended to clarify that, 
in general, domestic general and specific anti-abuse rules do 
not conflict with tax treaties. In this context, the so-called US 
savings clause is proposed to be incorporated, which negates 
the argument that a tax treaty prevents the application of con-
trolled foreign company rules. In our view, if the proposals are 
widely adopted, they will certainly reduce treaty abuse but at 
the same time create uncertainty for taxpayers operating in a 
global enviroment. From this perspective, these proposals, in 
our view, still need to be further refined.  
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